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Abstract 
Non-believed autobiographical memories (e.g. Mazzoni, Scoboria & Harvey, 2010) are 
striking examples of divergences between recollective experiences and beliefs in their 
correspondence to real events. After reviewing a broader range of similar phenomena, I argue 
that recollection-belief divergences can arise from normal, ‘healthy’ metacognitive 
monitoring and control processes that balance memory recollections and reality constraints. 
Such validating ‘reality checks’ draw on general world knowledge and external/social 
information. Importantly, changes in (perceived) reality constraints can lead to changes in 
memory beliefs. More generally, both recollection and (external) reality are keys to the past. 
In many cases, more or less automatic (System 1-type) reliance on recollection is sufficient 
(or memory would be useless as a system), but sometimes more elaborate (System 2-type) 
reality checks are needed. I conclude with some ideas about memory-driven and reality-driven 
recollection-belief divergences.  
 










Recollection, belief and metacognition: A reality check 
One of the most interesting recent developments in memory psychology is the 
discovery of non-believed autobiographical memories (Mazzoni, Scoboria & Harvey, 2010) 
and the subsequent systematic exploration of such divergences between (autobiographical) 
memory recollections and beliefs (Clark, Nash, Fincham & Mazzoni, 2012; Otgaar, Scoboria 
& Mazzoni, 2014; Scoboria et al., 2014). The intriguing insight offered by this research is that 
people can recollect autobiographical events from memory and at the same time believe that 
these events did not happen. Moreover, such non-believed memories are more than anecdotal 
occurrences but occur with some regularity (for instance, Mazzoni et al., 2010, report that 
20% of their sample held at least one).  
As spectacular as they may be, non-believed autobiographical event memories are not 
the only manifestations of divergences between recollections and beliefs in memory.  I will 
begin this article with a brief review of a few well-known memory phenomena that can be 
seen as further examples of recollection-belief divergences, with the purpose of demonstrating 
that the utility of differentiating between these two aspects of remembering is by no means 
limited to autobiographical memory. I will then point out that recollection-belief divergences 
reflect the normal operation of a metacognitive validation mechanism within the process of 
remembering (Blank, 2001, 2009). To ensure the functionality of the memory system, the raw 
output of the memory system (i.e. memory recollections) needs to be ‘reality-checked’ (which 
can occur in various different ways, including the consultation of external/social evidence), 
and sometimes this results in beliefs about the past that diverge from the raw memory output. 
Importantly, as reality constraints (e.g. social influence) may change over time, so will beliefs 
about the past, and consequently recollection-belief divergences may appear and disappear, 
which will be highlighted in a separate section. I will then explore the roles of individual 
memory and (social) reality as keys to the past more systematically, contrasting 
automatic/heuristic (System 1) and conscious/elaborate (System 2) ways of arriving at beliefs 
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about the past. I conclude with ideas about factors affecting recollection-belief divergences 
over time that could be explored in future research. 
Varieties of recollection-belief divergences 
Autobiographical non-believed memories are extreme examples of recollection-belief 
divergences in remembering, but such divergences can take on many different forms, 
depending on the nature of the recollection and belief in question. Recollection generally 
refers to some ‘raw output’ of the memory system (‘ecphoric information’, i.e. resulting from 
an ecphory process in which memory cues interact with stored information; Tulving, 1983). 
This output may be in the form of a visual image (or other sensory representation) or of a 
verbal/conceptual nature. Beliefs, by contrast, are formed on the basis of recollections and 
additional information in a process of memory validation (described in more detail in the next 
section) and entail as an essential feature an attribution to past reality (i.e. “this happened”). 
Importantly, in the present context, both recollections and beliefs vary along several 
dimensions including, at least, their generality/specificity (e.g. whole autobiographical 
episodes, major or minor events, or specific people, objects or actions within events1), 
clarity/strength (i.e. clear or vague recollections and beliefs held with strong or weak 
confidence) and their veracity (i.e. false or veridical recollections and/or beliefs). Along these 
                                                 
1 Beliefs related to autobiographical events – the example I started out with – are typically general, pertaining to 
whether or not the whole event ever truly happened. In the context of this special issue, it is important to point 
out that Scoboria et al. (2014) distinguish such general ‘beliefs in occurrence’ (a concept first introduced by 
Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002) from what they variously call ‘beliefs in recollection’ or ‘beliefs in accuracy’, that is, 
beliefs not just in the occurrence of an event but more specifically in the accuracy of the recollected event details 
(see also Rubin, 2006; Scoboria, Talarico & Pascal, 2015). I doubt that these two concepts can be sharply 
separated, mainly because there is no universally agreed-upon definition of ‘event’, and consequently what is an 
event associated with a belief in occurrence relative to one description (e.g. ‘the attacker pulled a knife’) may be 
a detail, related to a belief in accuracy, relative to a different description (e.g. ‘there was an assault’) – it is 
essentially a matter of event ‘grain size’. For the present purposes, it is more important to highlight what both 
types of beliefs have in common, namely that recollections are assigned a (subjective) truth value reflecting their 
correspondence to the actual past. This also applies to my independently developed notion of memory beliefs 
(Blank, 2001, 2009), which encompasses both understandings of ‘belief’ discussed so far (i.e. occurrence and 
accuracy), and which is also more inclusive in that it refers to any episodic memories (not only autobiographical 
ones). In the remainder of this article, I will variously speak of beliefs or memory beliefs, but always in the most 
adequate sense for the present purposes, that is, beliefs at any level of generality/specificity that come with a 
claim to past reality. 
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lines, a number of well-known memory phenomena can be reconstructed as different types of 
recollection-belief divergences (see Table 1).  
Déjà-vu. In déjà-vu experiences, the ‘raw output’ of the memory system consists in a 
feeling of recognition (e.g. of having been in some situation before), which is accompanied by 
a strong awareness of inaccuracy (i.e. certainty that one has never been in this situation; see 
Brown, 2003, for an overview). If we accept, for the present purposes, a feeling of recognition 
as some form of recollection2, a déjà-vu experience would accordingly constitute an example 
of a recollection-belief divergence.  
Misinformation effect. Divergences between recollection and belief can also arise in 
the classic eyewitness misinformation paradigm (Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978; see e.g. 
Zaragoza, Belli & Payment, 2006, for a review). Specifically, McCloskey and Zaragoza 
(1985) drew attention to conflicts between what people thought they remember from a 
witnessed stimulus event (e.g. a screwdriver in a toolbox) and what they trusted was an 
accurate account of that event (e.g. a narrative provided by the experimenter describing the 
tool as a hammer), leading them sometimes to distrust their own recollection and base their 
belief about this detail of the witnessed event on the narrative.  
Memories of childhood sexual abuse. Further, in the context of (recovered or false) 
adult memories of childhood sexual abuse (see Ost & Tully, 2016, for a review of the 
scientific controversy), two types of recollection-belief divergences may arise at different 
stages of engaging with the possibility of sexual abuse. Firstly, a person may not have any 
concrete memories of having been abused but may come to believe (e.g. over the course of a 
therapeutic process) that they had been (Case a); subsequently they may reconstruct or 
develop abuse memories and thereby reduce the divergence. Secondly, a person may have 
                                                 
2 A feeling of recognition (as featured in déjà vu) would translate into familiarity rather than recollection in some 
contexts (see e.g. Yonelinas, 2002). This distinction is not important for the argument I am developing here. 
What is crucial is the conceptual distinction between any initial output of the memory system – whether a feeling 
of familiarity or a detailed recollection of an event – and the truth value (in the sense of corresponding to past 
reality) assigned to this output. In keeping with the theme of this special issue, I will stick to the notion of 
recollection, but use it more broadly to refer to any type of recollective experience, however vague or detailed.  
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(developed) concrete abuse memories but later lose belief in them (Case b), for instance 
following a change in the social or therapeutic context (see Ost, Costall & Bull, 2001, 2002, 
for reviews of reasons for retracting sexual abuse memories); the memories may subsist or 
deteriorate over time (Ost, this issue). In the first case, the divergence exists between the 
belief of having been abused and the absence of a detailed recollection (or a vague and 
ambiguous one), and in the second case it consists in an ‘estranged’ recollection (similar to 
non-believed memories, but see Ost, this issue, for some differences).  
Stereotype-induced memory distortion. Finally (in this list), there is a whole literature 
on the distorting influence of social stereotypes – or also more generally expectations – on 
memory (see reviews by Fyock & Stangor, 1994; Stangor & McMillan, 1992; van 
Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 1996). In a classic demonstration, Allport and Postman (1945) 
showed participants an ambiguous aggressive encounter between two men, one of which held 
a knife. In line with the stereotype at the time, many participants later misremembered the 
black man involved in the encounter, rather than his white counterpart, to have pulled the 
knife. More generally, divergences can arise between recollected (and sometimes vague and 
ambiguous) person details or actions and related stereotypical beliefs about the prevalence of 
these in particular social group-related settings (and hence in the target episode), which will 
often be resolved through biased remembering of initially recollected stereotype-inconsistent 
details/actions/events in line with the stereotype-informed beliefs regarding the target episode  
(Fyock & Stangor, 1994; van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 1996).3 
- Insert Table 1 about here -  
This list is most certainly not complete, but it will suffice to make the point that 
recollection-belief divergences are neither rare occurrences nor limited to autobiographical 
                                                 
3 As an exception to this rule, the divergence may also be resolved in favour of the initial recollection if details 
or actions are so clearly stereotype-inconsistent that they had already been encoded (ʽtagged‘) as deviations from 
the stereotype (Stangor & McMillan, 1992).  
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memory. Moreover, it illustrates that these divergences can be quite varied in nature, 
consistent with the idea that both recollection and beliefs vary along dimensions of 
generality/specificity, clarity/strength and veracity. Sometimes – as in the cases of non-
believed autobiographical memories, ‘overruled’ event memories in misinformation studies, 
or (to some degree) retracted childhood sexual abuse memories – the divergence involves a 
lack of belief4 in a recollection from memory. In other cases – such as recovered/constructed 
memories of childhood sexual abuse or stereotypically biased memories of people or events – 
strong externally informed beliefs contrast with vague or absent memory recollections. And 
there may be cases in between, for example, vague recollections of events contrasting with 
slightly different versions provided by other people, etc. The important point to make in the 
next section is that such divergences can arise as a matter of course from normal, ‘healthy’ 
monitoring and control functioning within the memory system.  
Recollection-Belief Divergences and Validation  
Memory recollections in and of themselves are not necessarily of any use. In a process 
of validation, they need to be transformed into what I have called memory beliefs or beliefs 
about the past (Blank, 2001, 2009). That is, whatever pops up in one’s mind at some point 
needs to be interpreted as being about an actual past event – as opposed to a daydream, for 
instance – that happened in a particular way at a particular point in time (even though such 
qualifications may be vague). These beliefs may then be further communicated to the outside 
world and turned into observable remembering (see Blank, 2001, 2009, for detailed 
descriptions).  
What is important for our purposes here is that recollections need a ‘reality check’ 
before they can be endorsed as memory beliefs. This reality check can draw on different 
sources of information about the past. Firstly, people can draw on their own world 
knowledge. For instance, in Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch and Relyea’s (2004) nested model, 
                                                 
4 I am slightly simplifying things here; in many cases there is a (substantial) decrease but not a completely lack 
of belief in the memory. See Mazzoni et al. (2010) and Scoboria et al. (2014) for details related to 
autobiographical event memories; the same holds respectively for original event memories in misinformation 
studies and recollections of childhood sexual abuse. The important point, for our purposes, is that belief is 
substantially lower than recollection along a clarity/strength dimension.   
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memory beliefs first depend on general event plausibility and then further on personal 
plausibility (i.e. plausibility of such an event happening to oneself); that is, events need to be 
generally and personally plausible before they can be endorsed as beliefs about the past. 
Further, in some cases objective evidence is available (i.e. documents, photographs, 
audiotapes etc.) that can be consulted for validation purposes. Finally, people can draw on 
other people’s relevant knowledge about the past. This will typically be people who co-
experienced or co-witnessed an event, and the degree to which they are relied upon in forming 
memory beliefs will depend on (1) their perceived credibility and (2) the uncertainty around 
one’s own recollections (perhaps after one’s world knowledge and any objective evidence 
have been taken into account, although I am not suggesting a particular sequence in which 
these different sources of evidence about the past are consulted). The link between uncertainty 
and turning to social evidence was established more than half a century ago in Festinger’s 
theory of social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954), and opens the (theoretical) door to a 
world of research on social influence that can be applied to memory and remembering (but 
will not be covered here; see Blank, Walther & Isemann, 2016; Nash, Wheeler & Hope, 2015; 
for reviews). Suffice it to mention for illustration that in a survey of reasons to abandon belief 
in autobiographical memories, persuasive evidence provided by other people was by far the 
most prominent one (Scoboria, Boucher & Mazzoni, 2015).  
The processes involved in the validation of memory recollections and their outcomes 
vary as a function of the uncertainty of the memory recollection and the nature of the 
external5 evidence considered. Sometimes, (elements of) recollections may just be interpreted 
in a particular way, as in the case of stereotype-induced memory distortions. In other cases, 
they may be supplemented with plausible detail information, for instance from event 
schemata (see e.g. Pezdek et al., 1989) or from available post-event information (see 
McCloskey & Zaragoza’s misinformation acceptance process, 1985). In still other cases, 
recollected memory information may be contradicted and overridden by external evidence 
                                                 
5 By external I mean in this context ‘external to the memory recollection’. For instance, world knowledge may 
be individually acquired and internally stored, but it is separate from episodic or autobiographical recollections 
and in this sense considered external evidence.  
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(e.g. deciding in favour of credible misinformation in a deliberation process, McCloskey & 
Zaragoza, 1985; or retracting previous sexual abuse memories, Ost et al., 2001, 2002). Last 
not least, recollections may of course also be corroborated by external evidence; this should in 
fact be the most common case (or the reliability of the memory system would be in serious 
doubt).  
In any case, recollection-belief divergences may arise, in these various forms, during 
the normal process of validation of memory recollections (Blank, 2001, 2009). This validation 
function is of course also reflected in other, more explicitly meta-cognitive, approaches to 
remembering (e.g. Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Goldsmith & Koriat, 2008)6, although the 
monitoring process featured within Koriat and Goldsmith’s approach focusses more narrowly 
on confidence assessments and does not take external evidence bearing on the validity of the 
recollection into account (although there is no principal reason why this could not be built 
into the approach). Whatever the precise validation approach, the key principle is that 
memory recollections are subjected to reality constraints, and sometimes – such as with non-
believed autobiographical memories – the recollection has to ‘give in’ in the face of 
(perceived) reality. A corollary of this idea – to which I turn now – is that if (perceived) 
reality constraints change, memory beliefs may follow suit.  
Changed Views of Reality can Change Memory Beliefs 
Interestingly, while temporal trajectories of memories are very prominent features in 
any analysis of forgetting, they are rarely emphasised in research on memory distortion, as 
can be inferred from the fact that presumed-changed memories are rarely ever followed up. 
The recent distinction between memory recollections and beliefs, with its emphasis on the 
dynamic interplay between them (e.g. factors leading to loss of belief in recollections; 
Scoboria et al., 2015), also highlights the temporal dynamics and changeability of 
recollections and beliefs in general. A good illustration is research by Otgaar, Scoboria and 
Smeets (2013; see also Clark et al., 2012), which first created false memories (reflecting both 
                                                 
6 In fact, Mazzoni and Kirsch’s (2002) discussion of autobiographical beliefs (introducing the concept of ‘belief 
in occurrence’, see Footnote 1) draws in part on Koriat and Goldsmith’s work.  
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recollection and belief) in participants and then discredited them again (which affected belief 
more than recollection). Hence, both memory recollections and beliefs are variable over time 
as a function of the situational context, but beliefs more so than recollections (the latter 
having more ‘inertia’, so to speak). That memory beliefs should be more susceptible to 
change ties in nicely with Nash et al.’s (2015) argument that beliefs are particularly sensitive 
to social influence (which may lead to belief change), and it also fits with the idea (elaborated 
further below) that validating memory beliefs can be done in a more flexible System 2 style 
through consulting external sources of information, or alternatively in a more automatic and 
inflexible System 1 style, basing beliefs primarily on recollections.  
Several examples from the literature support the idea that memory beliefs can change 
as a function of changed external input into the validation process. For instance, Oeberst and 
Blank (2012) demonstrated a reversal of the misinformation effect as a function of post-
warning participants about the presence of misinformation. They initially established the 
presence of the misinformation effect under standard conditions. Then, participants were 
enlightened about the purpose and background of the research, including the presence of 
misinformation in the post-event narrative (thereby depriving it of its previous credibility), 
and were tested again (using different test formats in different experiments). In all of the three 
experiments, the misinformation effect was nullified. That is, people can readjust their 
memory beliefs and avoid distortion when they realise that previously relied-on external 
information was biased.  
A similar reversal has been demonstrated for stereotype-induced memory distortions 
(Blank, 2001, Chap. 6). Participants in this study first listened to audiotaped self-descriptions 
of four target persons (modelled to emulate a dating context). Later they answered multiple 
choice questions probing items from these descriptions, with stereotypical profession labels 
(e.g., a librarian or a butcher) provided for two of the four target persons. This resulted in a 
large stereotype effect in that for labelled target persons more stereotype-consistent false 
answers were chosen in the memory test. One week later, participants answered the same 
memory test again but were told beforehand that the professions had been made up and had 
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nothing to do with the real occupations of these people. This completely removed the 
stereotype-induced false answers and also increased the number of correct answers again. 
The most dramatic reversals (in practical terms) of memory beliefs, however, are 
found in retractions of childhood sexual abuse memories. Interestingly, in the present context 
of reality checks for recollections, some of these memories were no longer believed because 
they did not ‘feel real’ anymore, or because they felt ‘too real’ (to be true; my interpretation) 
(Ost et al., 2002). Apart from this, the study also found that changes in the social (e.g. 
therapeutic) setting often contributed to the loss of belief in the abuse memories. In summary, 
then, memory beliefs have been shown to vary along with the (perceived) reality constraints 
on relevant recollections.7 In the next section, I will put this in a more general perspective.  
Keys to the Past - Memory and Reality 
In a functional perspective – that is, if memories are supposed to have more than just 
curiosity value – humans (and other species) need to have reliable knowledge about the past. 
This is because, in a sufficiently non-random environment, the past gives useful guidance to 
support our current activities. It usually makes things easier if we remember how to find our 
way around the London Underground, where we stored important documents, or keep track of 
encounters with nice or not so nice people (for future reference). It is also useful to keep track 
of environment changes, as sometimes the system will further change and old knowledge and 
strategies may become useful again. In a wider social context, culturally shared knowledge 
about past relations between social groups or nations will undoubtedly help understand and 
predict current interactions. The latter point also makes clear that knowledge about the past 
need not come from personal recollection but can draw on oral or written history, or external 
sources of information in general (as has always been emphasised by the collective memory 
tradition; e.g. Middleton & Edwards, 1990).  
                                                 
7 It is a logical possibility that in these examples not only the memory beliefs but also the recollections 
themselves varied along with reality constraints. However, in line with research showing higher inertia of 
recollections than beliefs (Clark et al., 2012: Otgaar et al., 2013), theoretical reviews focussing on beliefs as the 
locus of memory suggestibility effects (Blank, 2001, 2009; Blank, Walther & Isemann, 2016; Nash et al., 2015), 
as well as considerations of theoretical parsimony, this logical possibility is not very compelling.  
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That is, knowledge about the past can principally be based on internal (recollections 
from our individual memory system) and external sources (other people’s or externalised, 
objectified knowledge), and often a combination will prove most reliable (hence the 
validation of recollections). An interesting question is to what degree we should rely on one 
or the other source, or in other words how much validation of recollections is needed (with 
the spectrum ranging, say, from just recognising and accepting a recollection as a memory to 
agonising over its veracity and spending months trying to find supporting external evidence). 
This question can be approached considering the memory system as a whole and from the 
perspective of the remembering individual. 
From a memory system perspective, it seems obvious that recollections are typically 
reliable (i.e. correspond to past reality), or human memory would be useless. My recollections 
of the London Underground connections would be useless if they didn’t bear any resemblance 
to the actual Underground layout (leaving route changes aside for the moment). This is why 
so many people stubbornly continue to believe in the reliability and accuracy of their 
memories (as shown in surveys of the general public; see Ost, Easton, Hope, French & 
Wright, in press, for a review; see also Niedźwieńska, Neckar & Baran, 2007), despite 
repeated attempts by cognitive psychologists to convince them of the opposite (but of course 
the psychologists have a point, too; see Nash & Ost, in press; Schacter, 1999). The people are 
right, to some degree. There is good reason for them to habitually trust their memory and for 
memory recollections and beliefs to co-vary (in other words, believed memories are much 
more frequent than non-believed memories; Mazzoni et al., 2010; Otgaar et al., 2013; 
Scoboria et al., 2004; 2014).  
From the perspective of the remembering individual, the decision as to how much to 
trust their recollections should depend, at least, on (a) the quality of the recollections, (b) the 
resources available for validation and (c) how much is at stake. The first point is rather 
unspectacular; vivid and clear recollections that contain the typical features of representations 
of real events (see Johnson, 1988; Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 2008; for 
source/reality monitoring approaches) require less extensive external validation than vague 
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and uncertain ones. The second and third points link to two-process theories of information 
processing, first developed in the context of attitude change and persuasive communication 
and then more broadly adopted in other fields, most commonly under the labels of System 1 
and System 2 (see e.g. Evans, 2008, for an overview).8  
When resources and stakes are low, it seems rational to just rely on one’s 
recollections, in typical System 1 style, with only superficial reality-checking. Conversely, 
when resources are plenty and stakes are high, extensive System 2-type validation seems 
more adequate. System 1-type reliance on (clear and vivid) recollections, like most heuristics, 
will lead to correct outcomes (i.e. accurate memory beliefs) in many cases, as is to be 
expected from the systemic analysis (i.e. the memory system being a generally reliable 
reflection of past reality). To increase the accuracy rate beyond this margin, however, more 
extensive System 2-type validation is required, particularly if the risks associated with 
misrepresentations of the past are high. I should note, though, that System 1-type 
remembering need not always rely on one’s own recollections only; accepting (trusted) other 
people’s recollections as cues to the past is another option (for instance, in the absence of own 
recollections). On the whole, however, habitual reliance on one’s own recollection should be 
the default, as they are usually more readily accessible than external evidence that needs to be 
sought out.  
In summary, memory, external reality and beliefs about the past are linked in a 
systemic way (see Figure 1). The memory system reflects (past) reality, while (current) 
reality, filtered through one’s own and other people’s knowledge about it, constrains the 
output of the memory system. Both recollections and reality thereby shape memory beliefs, 
and the precise way in which this happens (e.g. System 1- or System 2-style, and also how 
divergences between internal and external information are negotiated), depends on the quality 
                                                 
8 I use the System 1 and System 2 terminology rather loosely, as a shorthand for distinguishing between fast, 
automatic and unconscious processes on the one hand (System 1) and slow, deliberative and conscious processes 
on the other hand (System 2); System 1 processes do not require plenty of cognitive resources, but System 2 
processes do. These characterisations represent the endpoints of a continuum of processing, and in any given 
situation there may be a variable mixture of both types of processing. I do not commit to any specific dual-
processing model, nor to the idea that these systems physically exist as such (e.g. somewhere in the brain); see 
Evans’ (2008) review for a critical discussion of these issues.  
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of the information provided from both sources and on the importance of getting past reality 
right. This is, ultimately, the reason why recollection-belief divergences – a dramatic as they 
can be (see Mazzoni et al., 2010; Otgaar et al., 2014) – are not malfunctions of the memory 
system (as one might think initially) but, on the contrary, a sign of healthy social cognition 
that keeps the memory system aligned with reality.  
Memory- and Reality-Driven Divergences – some Ideas for Future Research 
As memory beliefs depend on both memory and reality, changes in either of these can 
drive recollection-belief divergences. As already mentioned, changes in (social) reality are a 
major driver of abandoned autobiographical memories (Ost et al., 2002; Scoboria et al., 
2015). Social influence, however, is certainly not the only reality constraint that can cause 
beliefs to diverge from recollections. From a developmental perspective, children’s evolving 
world knowledge should cause similar frictions. For instance, at some point children might 
question their recollections of Santa bringing them Christmas presents, or certainly reinterpret 
this past occurrence as involving a family member dressed up as Santa, rather than the ‘real’ 
Santa (and this in turn may re-shape the recollected features of Santa and the whole scene). 
Also, it is perhaps no coincidence that the disowning of autobiographical childhood memories 
typically begins around adolescence (Mazzoni et al., 2010), when young people’s world 
knowledge starts to depart strongly from their childhood beliefs. As a rule, any change in 
knowledge relevant to the content of recollections has the potential to change the associated 
memory beliefs.  
In addition to changes in (knowledge about) reality, changes in the recollection itself 
might drive recollection-belief divergences. One important factor should be time and 
forgetting-related changes in the phenomenological features of recollections (e.g. Crosland, 
1921). Over longer periods of time, recollections typically lose the richness of sensory detail 
that is characteristic of real event memories (Johnson, 1988), and therefore may at some point 
not ‘feel real’ any more. This could be compensated for, to some degree, by these 
recollections being ‘semanticised’ and integrated – over time and through repeated 
recollection – into an autobiographical knowledge structure (Linton, 1982). Thus, a loss in 
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recollective authenticity would be made up through a gain in autobiographical knowledge 
support, allowing autobiographical memory belief to be sustained for many autobiographical 
events. For some events (e.g. events that do not fit neatly into one’s self-concept), however, 
this may not be possible to the same degree, and such event recollections may eventually be 
driven under a ‘belief threshold’ and be abandoned and/or forgotten. In any case, the relation 
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Examples of Recollection-Belief Divergences 




recollection (incl. details) 
“I know this didn’t happen” 
Déjà vu Feeling of recognition “I know I’ve never been 
here before” 
Misinformation effect Original event details (e.g. a 
screwdriver) 
“I know from the narrative 
that it was a hammer” 
Childhood sexual abuse 
memories 
(a) Vague, ambiguous or 
absent recollection 
(b) (Recovered or false) 
recollection of abuse 
(a) “Now I’m confident that 
it was sexual abuse” 
(b) “Now I don’t believe 
this anymore” 
Stereotype influence on 
memory 
Vague, ambiguous or absent 
details or actions related to a 
stereotyped group 
“I’m confident that the 







Figure 1. Memory and reality as keys to the past. 
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